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Article 9

RAISING THE BAR: LAW CLERKS PAY TRIBUTE TO JUDGE
ADKINS
MONICA BASCHE ∗ & MICHAEL COLLINS, JR. ∗∗
Throughout her time on Maryland’s trial and appellate courts, Judge
Adkins has raised the bar for litigants and her fellow judges. Her decisions
consistently show a diligence and thoroughness which, although one party
must win, left all parties with the comfort of knowing that their arguments
had been recognized, understood, and considered. Even in cases involving
multiple issues, complicated or arcane legal doctrines, or nuanced facts,
Judge Adkins’ opinions demonstrate the thoroughness deserving of the
diligent advocacy presented by the parties.
One opinion that demonstrates this thoroughness is Kiriakos v. Phillips. 1
In Kiriakos, the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered one of the most
consequential tort law issues in the State’s history: whether the doctrine of
social host liability 2 could impose liability on parents who provide alcohol to
minors. 3 Judge Adkins begins her analysis by setting forth the parties
arguments. 4 From the jump, before any discussion of the merits of the
claims, Judge Adkins has framed the issues as presented by the parties, with
particular attention to the side which will, as the analysis will demonstrate,
ultimately lose. Even in rejecting the arguments of the losing party, Judge
Adkins discusses them at length, leaving the losing party with the
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1. 448 Md. 440, 139 A.3d 1006 (2016).
2. Social host liability imposes liability, either by statue or case law, on social hosts that serve
alcohol to adults or minors. For a general discussion of this theory of liability, see Mary M. French
et al., Social Host Liability for the Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1058
(1985).
3. Kiriakos, 448 Md. at 455–56, 139 A.3d at 1015–16.
4. Id. at 476, 139 A.3d at 1027–28 (“Kiriakos sues in common law negligence, asking us to
apply ‘traditional negligence principles,’ and engage in an ordinary duty of care analysis . . . .
Countering, Phillips avows: ‘labeling a theory that is clearly social host liability by a different name
is still social host liability.’”).
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understanding that the Court has considered the arguments and weighed them
diligently. 5
Sugarman v. Liles, 6 yet another case raising complicated issues of
Maryland tort law, illustrates Judge Adkins’ careful consideration of all the
parties’ arguments. 7 In Sugarman, the Court considered whether the plaintiff
provided sufficient evidence to prove that exposure to lead paint caused his
claimed cognitive defects. 8 Judge Adkins delves deeply into the scientific
literature underlying the expert opinions offered in the case, which provides
clarity and a deeper understanding regarding the issues of epidemiology,
scientific study, and how both of these relate to causation. Much of Judge
Adkins’ opinion focuses on clarifying and applying the “analytical gap” 9
standard, but it is safe to say that the Sugarman opinion suffers from no such
defective analysis. Her analysis and clear arguments shepherd the reader
from point to point as a means of educating and also persuading. Part of the
convincing nature of the analysis is her repeated referral to, and explanation
of, the losing arguments in the case. At each turn in the discussion of her
reasoning, Judge Adkins refers to the arguments the defendant-appellant
Sugarman propounded. A reader can easily spot the numerous instances of
“Sugarman maintains” or “Sugarman reasons,” all indicating that his
arguments have been noted and considered. 10
From reading Judge Adkins’ opinions, it is also apparent that she keeps
one crucial idea in mind: how will this decision impact the citizens of the
State of Maryland? Put another way, what is at stake? This idea is brought
even more to the forefront in her dissents, where she points out the potentially
troubling implications of the majority’s decision while honing in on the flaws
in its legal reasoning.
One dissent that masterfully illustrates Judge Adkins’ skill at discussing
the policy implications of a decision and taking the majority to task for its

5. Id. at 484–86, 139 A.3d at 1032–33 (“But, Phillips argues, he cannot owe a duty to Kiriakos
based on the concept of creating a risk because . . . . Neither are we persuaded by Phillips’s
assertion that . . . .”).
6. 460 Md. 396, 190 A.3d 344 (2018).
7. Id. at 401, 190 A.3d at 346–47 (“This case presents yet another opportunity for clarification
of when epidemiological studies relied upon by an expert provide a sufficient factual basis for the
expert’s testimony. Specifically, we shall consider whether an expert’s opinion on causation,
relying on epidemiological studies, suffers from the same ‘analytical gap’ identified in [the Court’s
earlier jurisprudence].”).
8. Id. at 401–02, 190 A.3d at 346–47.
9. Id. at 425, 190 A.3d at 361 (“As we explained in Savage v. State, 455 Md. 138, 163, 166
A.3d 183 (2017), the ‘hallmark’ of the analytical gap is ‘the failure by the expert witness to bridge
the gap between his or her opinion and the empirical foundation on which the opinion was
derived.’”).
10. See, e.g., id. at 413–14, 190 A.3d at 354 (“Sugarman urges us . . . . Sugarman
maintains . . . . Sugarman reasons . . . .”).
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analysis is Warr v. JMGM Group, LLC, 11 a case in which the Maryland Court
of Appeals declined to adopt dram shop liability. 12 Judge Adkins begins her
dissent by telling the story of that particular case, in which a bar patron
consumed “at least twenty-one alcoholic drinks, to the point of becoming
violent and aggressive” over the course of six hours. 13 The patron then
“drove down the road at eighty-eight to ninety-eight miles per hour, collided
with another car, and killed an innocent ten-year-old child.” 14 Judge Adkins
then zooms out to highlight how the facts of Warr are only a snapshot of a
bigger problem: drunk driving in Maryland. 15 She does not mince words:
“[A]n average of 220 people died annually as a result of impaired-drivingrelated crashes on Maryland roads. . . . This equates to 18 deaths a month or
a death every 40 hours,” 16 with many of those drivers coming from
“commercial vendors”—like the bar involved in Warr. 17 The practical—and
legal—solution: dram shop liability. 18
Deftly pulling the reader along, Judge Adkins pivots to the legal
rationale for adopting dram shop liability. Although thirty-two years earlier
the Court of Appeals had declined to adopt dram shop liability to allow the
General Assembly to address the issue, the legislature’s time had run out. 19
Again, Judge Adkins reminds the reader what is at stake: “I urge that we no
longer sit idly by, and refuse to help, as people continue to die at such a
rate.” 20 She then weaves in the law: “I submit that we can save lives by
recognizing dram shop liability and do so based on the well-established
principles of our common law.” 21 Again, Judge Adkins does not mince
words: “[T]he Majority . . . abandons the reasoning of this Court’s precedent,

11. 433 Md. 170, 70 A.3d 347 (2013).
12. The term “dram shop liability” refers to liability imposed on commercial sellers of alcohol
for negligently serving a patron who ultimately injures a third party. See Dram-Shop Liability,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
13. Warr, 433 Md. at 199–200, 70 A.3d at 365 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 200, 70 A.3d at 365.
15. Id.
16. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting TASK FORCE TO COMBAT DRIVING
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS AND ALCOHOL, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1–2
(2008)).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 200–01, 70 A.3d at 365 (quoting Veda Rammohan et al., Effects of Dram Shop
Liability and Enhanced Overservice Law Enforcement Initiatives on Excessive Alcohol
Consumption and Related Harms, 41 AM. J. PREV. MED. 334, 340 (2011)). Judge Adkins notes
“several studies ‘that assessed the effects of dram shop liability on alcohol-related motor vehicle
fatalities found a median reduction of 6.4%.’” Id. at 201, 70 A.3d at 366 (quoting Rammohan et
al., supra, at 339). “With 220 deaths caused by alcohol-related crashes each year in Maryland, a
6.4% reduction would save 14 lives every year.” Id.
19. Id. at 202, 70 A.3d at 366.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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which was based on proximate cause, and instead, creates its own duty-ofcare analysis.” 22
By the end of Judge Adkins’ dissent, even if the reader does not
understand the legal analysis she sets forth, the reader understands that drunk
driving deaths are a preventable problem and that there is a legal solution.
The reader also understands what is at stake for Maryland citizens because
the Court declined to adopt dram shop liability.
Judge Adkins took the same two-pronged approach in People’s
Insurance Counsel Division v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 23 a case that
the majority dismissed as improvidently granted. 24 People’s Insurance
Counsel Division involved the interpretation of a homeowner’s insurance
contract provision. 25 The insureds’ carport had collapsed during a blizzard,
and their insurance company denied coverage because the carport was not a
“building” within the meaning of the contract. 26
First, Judge Adkins points out the policy implications for dismissing the
case as improvidently granted: unfairness to the litigants and waste of judicial
resources (and the attendant injury to the Court’s reputation). 27 Second,
Judge Adkins notes, dismissing the case as improvidently granted was
contrary to Maryland law. 28 The majority could not conclude that there was
“no issue of public importance, that the issue was not preserved, or that there
is an inadequate record by which to render useful guidance.” 29 Judge Adkins
then returns the focus to what is most important: dismissing the case as
improvidently granted impacts Maryland citizens. 30 She concludes:
“[U]nfortunately, the litigants and public are left in the dark again, in a case
that could impact thousands of Maryland homeowners.” 31
Like in Warr, even if the reader does not understand the legal analysis,
the reader understands that the litigants in this case are left without an answer
to their question, after expending time, energy, and resources briefing the
case and presenting oral argument. 32 The reader also understands that the
22. Id.
23. 442 Md. 55, 109 A.3d 1208 (2015) (per curiam).
24. Id. at 56, 109 A.3d at 1209.
25. Id. (Adkins, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 56–57, 109 A.3d at 1209.
27. Id. at 56, 109 A.3d at 1209 (“Because I think that this Court should act with great restraint
when choosing to dismiss a case as improvidently granted, both because it is unfair to the parties
and a waste of judicial resources, I dissent.”).
28. Id. at 58–64, 109 A.3d at 1210–13.
29. Id. at 58, 109 A.3d at 1210.
30. Id. at 64, 109 A.3d at 1213.
31. Id.
32. See id. (“Our decision to avoid these questions does nothing to clarify or advance the law.
And it gives short shrift to the litigants before us after they have performed the onerous work of
preparing briefs and record extracts, as well as preparing and conducting oral arguments.”).

2019]

TRIBUTE TO JUDGE SALLY ADKINS

695

litigants, as well as thousands of other Maryland citizens, are now potentially
without insurance coverage for damage to their property as a result of a
blizzard. 33 Quoting Chief Judge Bell, Judge Adkins closes by invoking the
Court’s “mandate[] to serve” the people of the State of Maryland and
asserting that the Court has not justified to the people its reason for dismissing
the case as improvidently granted. 34
While these are only two of Judge Adkins’ dissents, you can see that it
is her mission to serve the citizens of Maryland. From surveying Judge
Adkins’ opinions, a reader can readily discern that she strives to hold the
Court to the highest standards. What the reader does not know, however, is
that behind the scenes Judge Adkins held her law clerks to high professional
standards. Throughout Maryland and the greater United States, her legacy
will continue to impact the legal profession––not only through the thousands
of pages of jurisprudence she has authored, but in the dozens of lawyers she
has mentored. For many of her law clerks, clerking for Judge Adkins was
their first real opportunity to apply legal analysis and reasoning. Working
with Judge Adkins at such an early stage in one’s career presents an
opportunity to not only learn from one of the best, but also to adopt good
habits that form the basis of a successful legal career. Whether it be as a legal
writer, mentor, or professional, Judge Adkins provided a terrific example for
the young lawyers that had the privilege of working with her during her time
on the bench. Ultimately, it is for this opportunity that the authors of this
tribute, speaking for all of Judge Adkins’ law clerks, say this: thank you!

33. See id. (“We owe the parties and the people of the State due consideration of the issues
properly presented. Here, unfortunately, the litigants and public are left in the dark again, in a case
that could impact thousands of Maryland homeowners.”).
34. Id. (quoting Koenig v. State, 368 Md. 150, 159, 792 A.2d 1124, 1130 (2002) (per curiam)).

